We study the complexity of robust quantum algorithms. These still work with high probability if the n input bits are noisy. We exhibit a robust quantum algorithm that recovers the complete input with high probability using O(n) queries. This implies that every n-bit function can be quantum computed robustly with O(n) queries, which contrasts with Feige et al. 's Ω(n log n) classical bound for PARITY. We also give similar bounds on the degrees of multilinear polynomials that robustly approximate Boolean functions.
Introduction
Suppose that we want to compute some function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, but our access to the nbit input x is marred by noise: when looking up ("querying") the bit x i , there is a probability ≤ ǫ < 1/2, of getting the wrong value 1 − x i . Many algorithms designed for noiseless input will fail when given such noisy input. For example, the trivial algorithm for computing OR ("query every bit and output 1 if x i = 1 for at least one i") will probably fail on the all-zero input when ǫ > 1/n.
Feige et al. [3] studied the overhead it takes to make an algorithm robust, i.e., resistant against noisy inputs. In general, one can query a variable x i O(log n) times instead of once, and take the majority value as the value of x i . This reduces ǫ to ≪ 1/n. In this case, the union bound implies that with high probability all queries will be given the correct value, so a noiseless algorithm will work. Accordingly, any non-robust algorithm in the decision-tree or query-complexity model can be made robust at the cost of a factor O(log n) overhead (in fact, O(log T ) would suffice for a T -query algorithm). Sometimes this factor of O(log n) is necessary: Feige et al. proved that any robust algorithm to compute the PARITY function needs Ω(n log n) queries, for fixed ǫ. On the other hand, for some functions the O(log n) can be dispensed with: Feige et al. also designed a non-trivial robust algorithm that computes the OR with O(n) queries, only a constant factor worse than the noiseless case.
We study the issue of robust algorithms in the quantum world, using query complexity as our complexity measure. Most of the work done on quantum lower bounds fits in this model and most of the known quantum algorithms can be cast in it, including Deutsch-Jozsa's, Simon's, Grover's and Shor's algorithm. We refer to [2] for a survey of this model.
There is an issue as to what a "noisy query" means in the quantum case, since one application of a quantum query can address many different x i 's in superposition. A first proposal would be that for each quantum query, each of the bits is flipped with probability ǫ. However, now each quantum query introduces a lot of randomness, and the algorithm's state after the query would no longer be a pure quantum state.
A second model, which we will adopt here, is to assume that we have n quantum procedures, A 1 , . . . , A n , such that A i outputs x i with probability at least 1 − ǫ. This is not unreasonable. For instance, it could be the case that the input bits are actually computed for us by subroutines. Such algorithms can always be made coherent by pushing measurements to the end, which means that we can apply and reverse them at will. To enable us to apply the A i 's in superposition, we assume we have a black box A : |i |0 → |i A i |0 .
One application of this will count as one query.
A third model, which we will call the multiple-faulty-copies model, was studied by Szegedy and Chen [8] . Here, instead of x i , the algorithm can only query "perturbed" copies y i,1 , . . . , y i,m of x i . The y i,j are independent Boolean random variables with Pr[x i = y i,j ] ≥ 1 − ǫ for each i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , m. In contrast to the first proposal, this model leaves the queries perfectly reversible, since the perturbed copies are fixed at the start of the algorithm and the same y i,j can be queried more than once. The assumption of this model is also stronger than the second model, since we can construct a 1-query A i that just outputs a superposition of all y i,j . If m is sufficiently large, A i will compute x i with high success probability, satisfying the assumption of the second model (see Section 4 for details).
Assuming the second model and some fixed ǫ, we call a quantum algorithm robust if it computes f with bounded error probability when its inputs are given by algorithms A 1 , . . . , A n . A first observation is that every T -query non-robust algorithm can be made robust at a multiplicative cost of O(log T ). With O(log T ) queries, a majority gate, and an uncomputation step, we can construct a unitaryŨ x that approximates an exact quantum query U x : |i |b → |i |b ⊕ x i very well: U x −Ũ x ≤ 1/100T . Since errors add linearly in a quantum algorithm, replacing U x bỹ U x in a non-robust algorithm gives a robust algorithm with almost the same final state. In some cases better constructions are possible. For instance, a recent result by Høyer et al. [5] immediately implies a quantum algorithm that robustly computes OR with O( √ n) queries. This is only a constant factor worse than the noiseless case, which is Grover's algorithm [4] . In fact, we do not know of any function where the robust degree is more than a constant factor larger than the non-robust approximate degree. Our main result (made precise in Theorem 1) is the following:
There exists a quantum algorithm that outputs x with high probability, using O(n) invocations of the A i algorithms (i.e., queries).
This result implies that every n-bit function f can be robustly quantum computed with O(n) queries. This contrasts with the classical Ω(n log n) lower bound for PARITY. It is quite interesting to note that quantum computers, which usually are more fragile than classical computers, are actually more robust in the case of computing PARITY with noisy inputs. The results for OR and PARITY can be extended to every symmetric function f : for every such function, the optimal quantum algorithm can be made robust with only a constant factor overhead (Section 3).
Our main result has a direct bearing on the direct-sum problem, which is the question how the complexity of computing n independent instances of a function scales with the complexity of one instance. One would expect that computing n instances with bounded-error takes no more than n times the complexity of one instance. However, since we want all n instances to be computed correctly simultaneously with high probability, the only known general method is to compute each instance with error probability reduced to O(1/n), which costs another factor of O(log n). In fact, it follows from the Ω(n log n) bound for PARITY that this factor of n log n is optimal when we can only run algorithms for individual instances in a black-box fashion. In contrast, our result implies that in the quantum world, the bounded-error complexity of n instances is at most O(n) times the bounded-error complexity of one instance. This is a very general result. For example, it also applies to communication complexity [7, Section 4.1.1]. If Alice and Bob have a bounded-error protocol for a distributed function f , using c bits (or qubits) of communication, then there is a boundederror quantum protocol for n instances of f , using O(n(c + log n)) qubits of communication. The additive log n is because Alice and Bob need to communicate (possibly in superposition) the index of the instance that they are computing. In contrast, the best known general classical solution uses Θ(cn log n) bits of communication.
In addition to robust quantum algorithms, we also consider robustness for multivariate polynomials approximating Boolean functions. In general, there are many connections between the (quantum or classical) query complexity of an n-bit function and the degrees of n-variate polynomials that approximate it [2] . We consider two complementary definitions of robust polynomials. First, in analogy to the multiple-faulty-copies model, we can consider the usual approximating polynomial but on nm instead of just n binary variables, and require that if Pr[
Secondly, we can define a robust polynomial for a Boolean function f to operate on n variables
In Section 5 we show that the two types of robust polynomials are essentially equivalent, and that any non-robust approximating polynomial of degree d can be made robust at the cost of increasing its degree by a factor O(log d). Beals et al. [1] showed that every T -query quantum algorithm for f gives rise to a degree-2T approximating polynomial for f , and similarly one can show that every T -query robust quantum algorithm for f induces a degree-2T polynomial that approximates f robustly. This implies, for instance, that the robust degree of OR is Θ( √ n), and that every n-bit function has robust degree O(n).
Note about related work: In a recent manuscript, Iwama et al. [6] studied a similar but slightly weaker setting. There, the error probability for each input variable is the same ǫ. If ǫ is known, then one can use a version of exact amplitude amplification to "rotate off" the error using O(1) queries and hence make the algorithm robust. If ǫ unknown, it can be estimated very well using quantum amplitude estimation, after which amplitude amplification can be used as if ǫ was known. Iwama et al. derive from this that any quantum algorithm can be made robust (in their model) with only a constant factor overhead. In contrast, we do not need that assumption here.
Robustly Recovering All n Bits
In this section we prove our main result, that we can recover an n-bit string x using O(n) invocations of algorithms A 1 , . . . , A n where A i computes x i with bounded error.
Theorem 1 Given ǫ-error algorithms A 1 , . . . , A n for the bits x 1 , . . . , x n , there is a quantum algorithm that recovers x = x 1 . . . x n with probability 2/3 using O(n/(1/2 − ǫ) 2 ) queries (invocations of the A i ).
Procedure RobustFind(n, A, ǫ, β, γ, δ) n ∈ N, A : n quantum algorithms, ǫ, β, γ, δ > 0 Output:
i ∈ [n] ∪ {⊥} with the following properties:
1. if A is ǫ-close to x ∈ {0, 1} n and |x| ≥ βn, then i =⊥ with probability at least 1 − δ 2. if A is ǫ-close to x ∈ {0, 1} n and if i =⊥, then x i = 1 with probability at least 1 − γ Complexity:
We assume A i is a unitary transformation
|ψ 0 i and |ψ 1 i are arbitrary (t − 1)-qubit norm-1 quantum states. Any quantum algorithm can be expressed in this form by postponing measurements; any classical randomized algorithm can be converted into this form by making it reversible and replacing random bits by states (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2. By applying a NOT to the first qubit after the execution of A i , we can easily implement
, which operates like A i but outputs 1 when A i would have output 0 and vice versa. Let
If we plug the right bit x i into A i , then for all A i we expect output 0: for the unique good x ∈ {0, 1} n , A(x) := (A 1 (x 1 ), . . . , A n (x n )) is ǫ-close to 0 n by the following notion of closeness:
Definition 1 For ǫ < 1/2 and decision algorithms A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ), we say A is ǫ-close to
Our algorithm builds on a robust quantum search algorithm by Høyer, Mosca, and de Wolf [5] : the RobustFind subroutine above takes a vector A of n quantum algorithms and in the good case returns an index i so that the "high probability" output of A i is 1. This allows us to verify a purported solutionx ∈ {0, 1} n by running RobustFind on Ax to find differences with the real input x. In fact, adjusting the parameters to RobustFind as we move closer and closer to a good solution, our main program AllOutputs (as defined by the pseudo code on page 5) manages to construct the unique x with high probability. Note that RobustFind is the only quantum component of our otherwise classical algorithm.
Procedure InitialGuess(n, A) n ∈ N, A : n algorithms
run
Procedure FindAllBad(n, A,x, ǫ, β, γ, δ) n ∈ N, A : n algorithms,x ∈ {0, 1} n , ǫ, β, γ, δ > 0 7: returnx Success probability. The first step of our algorithm (Line 1 in AllOutputs) is to classically sample each i once and to store this initial approximation into a variablex. The following rounds of the algorithm refinex until with high probability it is correct (i.e., equal to x).
We call i a bad index if i ∈ [n] and Pr[A i outputs x i ] ≤ ǫ. Let B 0 denote the random variable counting the number of bad indices after Line 1 in AllOutputs and let B k denote the random variable of the number of bad indices after Line 5 in AllOutputs. By G k we denote the event B k ≤ nǫ/2 k−1 . We have
We now show that Pr[G k |G k−1 ] is large. For k = 0, we know that E[B 0 ] ≤ ǫn and Pr[B 0 ≤ 2ǫn] ≥ 9/10 by a Chernoff bound. In round k, we want to reduce the upper bound on the number of bad indices from 2nǫ/2 k−1 to nǫ/2 k−1 . If we have the maximum number of bad indices so that still G k holds, we expect r repetitions of RobustFind to reduce the number of bad indices to
therefore we choose r := 11 10
On the other hand, if we have only a small number b of bad indices, it is likely that we will make many errors, so we would like b + γr ≤ 9 10
This is satisfied by choosing b := 0.3nǫ/2 k−1 ; this choice of b also ensures that we never get as few as b bad indices if we start the round with 2nǫ/2 k−1 bad indices. We tune RobustFind to find bad indices with probabilities δ and γ if there are at least b bad indices. Hence, in the extreme cases of either having exactly 2nǫ/2 k−1 or less than b bad indices, we expect to arrive at at most (9/10) · nǫ/2 k−1 bad indices, and this holds for the intermediary cases as well. By a Chernoff-type argument, the probability that we are a constant factor 10/9 away from the expectation is exponentially small in the number r of samples, therefore, with k max = log(ǫ(log n) 2 ), we have
Hence, for large n with probability 8/10 we have at most n/(log n) 2 bad indices at Line 6 in AllOutputs. In this case, we will find with constant probability all bad indices by making the individual error probability in RobustFind so small that we can use a union bound: we determine each of the remaining bad indices with error probability 1/(10n). This implies an overall success probability ≥ (8/10) · (9/10) > 2/3.
Complexity. We bound the number of queries to f in SampleBad as follows:
for some constants C, C ′ . The call to FindAllBad results in
many queries. Therefore, the total query complexity of AllOutputs is O(n/(1/2 − ǫ) 2 ).
Consequences
Here we state a few corollaries of our main result. First, once we have recovered the input x we can compute any function of x without further queries, hence
Corollary 1 For every f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, there is a robust quantum algorithm that computes f using O(n) queries.
In particular, PARITY can be robustly quantum computed with O(n) queries while it takes Ω(n log n) queries classically [3] . Second, in the context of the direct-sum problem, the complexity of quantum computing a vector of instances of a function scales linearly with the complexity of one instance.
Corollary 2 (Direct Sum) If there exists a T -query bounded-error quantum algorithm for f , then there is an O(T n)-query bounded-error quantum algorithm for n independent instances of f .
As mentioned, the best classical upper bound has an additional factor of log n, and this is optimal in a classical black-box setting.
Thirdly, all symmetric functions can be computed robustly on a quantum computer with the same asymptotic complexity as non-robustly. A function is symmetric if its value only depends on the hamming weight of the input. Let Γ(f ) := min{|2k − n + 1| : f flips value if the Hamming weight of the input changes from k to k + 1}. The non-robust algorithm for computing f with O( n(n − Γ(f ))) queries [1, Theorem 4.10] can be made robust by a similar algorithm as the one used in the proof of Theorem 1, giving:
Theorem 2 For every symmetric function f , there is a robust quantum algorithm that computes f using O( n(n − Γ(f ))) quantum queries.
The Multiple-Faulty-Copies Model
As mentioned in the introduction, the assumption that we have a bounded-error algorithm A i for each of the input bits x i also covers the model of [8] where we have a sequence y i,1 , . . . , y i,m of faulty copies of x i . These we can query by means of a mapping |i |j |0 → |i |j |y i,j .
Here we spell out this connection in some more detail. First, by a Chernoff bound, choosing m := O(log(n)/ǫ 2 ) implies that the average y i := m j=1 y i,j /m is close to x i with very high probability:
.
By the union bound, with probability 99/100 this closeness will hold for all i ∈ [n] simultaneously. Assuming this is the case, we implement the following unitary mapping using one query to the y i,j :
Measuring the last qubit of the resulting state gives x i with probability at least 1 − 2ǫ. Hence, we can run our algorithm from Section 2 and recover x using O(n) queries to the y i,j . Similarly, all consequences mentioned in the last section hold for this multiple-faulty-copies model as well.
Robust Polynomials
In this section we study robust polynomials, of two different but essentially equivalent types. The first type follows the many-faulty-copies model.
Definition 2 An (ǫ, m) perturbation of x ∈ {0, 1} n is a matrix y of n × m independent binary random variables y i,j so that Pr[
Definition 3 A type-1 (ǫ, m)-robust polynomial for the Boolean function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a real polynomial p in nm variables y i,j (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m) so that for every x ∈ {0, 1} n and
The approximation "quality" of a type-1 robust polynomial can be boosted at constant multiplicative cost in the degree. Analogously we can improve the parameters to any other constant. Proof. Let p 0 denote the type-1 (ǫ, m)-robust polynomial that we start with. The single-variate polynomial g(a) := (2a−1)(1+a(2+a/22(1+45a(a−2)))) has the property that −1/9 ≤ g 3 (a) ≤ 1/9 for −1/3 ≤ a ≤ 1/3 and 8/9 ≤ g 3 (a) ≤ 10/9 for 2/3 ≤ a ≤ 4/3; here g t (a) denotes the t-fold application of g.
For some r to be determined later and an arbitrary x ∈ {0, 1} n , we use r independent (ǫ, m) perturbations y k of x, 1 ≤ k ≤ r. Let B denote the random variable counting the number of The second kind of robust polynomial is the following:
Definition 4 A type-2 ǫ-robust polynomial for the Boolean function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is a real polynomial q in n variables z 1 , . . . , z n ∈ R so that for any x ∈ {0, 1} n and z ∈ R n we have
This means that q(z) is a type-2 ǫ-robust polynomial for f of degree O(d).
Definition 5 For f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, let rdeg 1 (f ) denote the minimum degree of any type-1 (1/3, 5 log n) polynomial for f , rdeg 2 (f ) be the minimum degree of any type-2 1/3-robust polynomial approximating f , and deg(f ) be the minimum degree among all approximating polynomials for f .
Note that in Definition 3 we require for type-1 polynomials p that for any Boolean assignment v ∈ {0, 1} nm to the (possibly real) variables, the polynomial value p(v) between −1/3 and 4/3. Because of this totality requirement, the following corollaries are given for total Boolean functions.
We now proceed to show that a non-robust degree-d approximating polynomial can be made robust at a cost of a factor O(log d) in the degree. The proof makes use of the well known notion of certificate complexity.
Definition 6 An assignment C : S → {0, 1} of values to some subset S ⊆ [n] of the n variables is consistent with x ∈ {0, 1} n if x i = C(i) for all i ∈ S. For b ∈ {0, 1}, a b-certificate for f is an assignment C such that f (x) = b whenever x is consistent with C. The size of C is |S|, the cardinality of S. The certificate complexity C x (f ) of f on x is the size of a smallest f (x)-certificate that is consistent with x. The certificate complexity of f is C(f ) = max x C x (f ).
Lemma 5 Let p be an ǫ-approximating polynomial for f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, and c = C(f ) be the certificate complexity of f . If x ∈ {0, 1} n and z ∈ R n satisfies |x
Proof. Consider a certificate C for x of size c. We will use x C and x C to denote the parts of x corresponding to C and to its complement, respectively, and write x = x C x C . If y ∈ {0, 1} n is chosen according to the z-distribution (y i = 1 with probability z i ), then
Now consider the expectation E y C [p(y C y C )], where y C ∈ {0, 1} n−c is fixed, while the y C -bits are still chosen according to the z-distribution. Consider the c-variate polynomial obtained from p by fixing the bits in y C . Since the "error" in the z C -variables is at most 1/10c, we have Pr[y C = x C ] ≥ (1 − 1/10c) c ≥ 9/10, so | E y C [p(y C y C )] − p(x C y C )| ≤ (1/10)(4/3) = 2/15 .
But f (x C y C ) = f (x), because the input x C y C satisfies the same certificate as x. Hence
and also |p(z) − f (x)| ≤ ǫ + 2/15.
This lemma implies that we can make a non-robust approximating polynomial robust at the cost of a factor of O(log C(f )) in the degree (replace each variable by a O(log C(f ))-degree error-reducing polynomial). Since C(f ) and deg(f ) are polynomially related (C(f ) = O( deg(f ) 4 ) see [2] ), we obtain:
Theorem 6 rdeg 1,2 (f ) = O( deg(f ) · log deg(f )).
Discussion and Open Problems
Here we mention some open problems. First, in contrast to the classical case (PARITY) we don't know of any function where making a quantum algorithm or polynomial robust costs more than a constant factor. In the case of symmetric functions, such a constant overhead suffices. It is conceivable that quantum algorithms and polynomials can always be made robust at a constant factor overhead. Proving or disproving this would be very interesting.
We have chosen our model of a noisy query so that we can coherently make a query and reverse it. An open question is whether the advantage of quantum algorithms can be maintained for decohering queries, like the first model proposed in the introduction. It is not clear to what extent non-robust quantum algorithms can be made resilient against such random noise, since the usual transformations to achieve fault-tolerant quantum computation do not immediately apply to the query gate, which acts on a non-constant number of quantum bits simultaneously.
